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This paper will examine the relationship between a country’s history and its actions 
on the international stage through the prism of the "strategic culture" theoretical framework 
created in works by Alistair Ian Johnston, Elizabeth Keir, Jack Snyder, and others. The 
central question of the study will be whether or not an understanding of a state’s past 
actions, rhetoric, and/or cultural obligations can provide an accurate predictor of future 
action and the primary thesis is that national “strategic culture” has a causal effect on 
national policy decisions. Towards this end, I have chosen to conduct a case study to 
ascertain the impact and validity of the “strategic culture” concept. A case study design 
will allow for a fine-grained examination of “strategic culture” and its effects in greater 
detail. The particular case that will be examined is that of Australia. The essay will begin 
with a literature review, then progress to analysis of various forms of primary evidence 
such as national security documents, speeches, and historical actions, and finally conclude 











In the mind of a lay observer there is often a perceived connection between the 
"cultural" of a society, the rhetoric of a given country's leadership, and the military actions 
of that country. Furthermore, there often exists a belief and a wish that the articulated 
military strategy and doctrine should be consistent with this perceived "culture." The 
existence of such a phenomenon is often taken for granted among the rank and file of the 
nation, but does it really exist and does it provide an effective barometer for a given 
nation's security agenda? This question has been posed in a number of different fields and 
via a myriad of differing theoretical paradigms. In the field of political science one of the 
most prominent of these proposed models is that of strategic culture.  However, 
determining exactly what strategic culture is and how to define it is a more difficult 
question than it would first appear to be. In the the scholastic literature there are a number 
of different definitions used. These definitions range for strategic culture that range from 
"modes of thought and action with respect to force" (Gray,1981, 22,), to the "sum total of 
ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior" (Snyder, 1977), 
an amalgamation of civilian constraints and military doctrine (Kier, 1995, 68), and many 
other more diverse definitions.  
This thesis adheres to the following format. First, I examine the concept of strategic 
culture, how it has evolved, and some of the advantages of each iteration. Then I examine 
more closely at the specific definitional paradigm I have chosen to frame my case study of 
Australia, Ian Johnston's conception of strategic culture. Following this I will apply Ian 
Johnston's framework to the Australian case. The study of Australia conducted herein has 
two main objectives. The first is to locate evidence of an Australian Strategic Culture and 
then, if one is found to exist, determine what form it has taken. As I described above for 
the purposes of this study this will take the form of a prevailing attitude among the foreign 
policy and military elite towards international relations as a whole, but most specifically 
towards the strategic considerations of military decisions.  The second, and perhaps more 
pressing, issue is whether or not the "strategic culture" model, as outlined above, 
effectively captures the goals within Australia's national security agenda. This particular 
case study will only examine material from the last fifty years. Johnston points out it is 
important that the analysis begins at the "earliest point in history that is accessible" 
(Johnston, 1995a, p.49), however I believe that the scope of the research conducted for this 
study will prove sufficient for two reasons. 
First, Australia did not become truly independent, especially on matters of foreign 
policy, from the British Empire until following the adoption of the Westminster Statute in 
1941.This means that while a fair amount of of the "cultural baggage" that the ADF must 
consider when establishing its preferences may come from era's prior to the documents 
examined for this study there were no singularly Australian views on anything in the 
foreign policy realm prior to this documents. The second reason is that these documents 
stretch as far enough back into the past that the reader can see the progression and 
evolution of any "strategic culture" over time, but is not overwhelmed by a past that may 
frankly be irrelevant for the purposes of analyzing the contemporary Australian strategic 
preferences. 
Strategic Culture: The Evolution of an Idea 
For the purposes of this paper and for the sake of simplicity I borrow from Alastair 
Johnston’s 1995 essay Thinking About Strategic Culture and divide the different strategic 
culture theorists into three distinct generations of thinkers. The first group, epitomized by 
the work of  Colin Gray and David Jones, created a conception of strategic culture that 
placed a great deal of emphasis on historical analysis and using that analysis to make 
determinative judgments of future action. The second group of theorists, led by Bradley 
Klein, took a slightly softer and less deterministic tone that eschewed much of the 
historical analysis in favor of an analysis of a given nation's contemporary political 
discourse. The third and final generation sought to bring together its theoretical precedents. 
This attempted synthesis created a slightly more jumbled yet more inclusive body of work. 
The third generation vision of strategic culture led to a model that sees cultural attitudes as 
a limiter and lens through which possible strategic decisions are evaluated.  
  The First Generation.  This first grouping of theorists began their work in the late 
1970's and the early 1980's and includes writings by theorists Jack Snyder, Colin Gray, and 
others. The thinkers of this group were among the first to begin formalizing the layperson's 
long held idea that a given nation's military doctrine was the product of the combination of 
relative military power and shared national values. This group began by postulating the 
existence of a shared national culture and military attitude that could effectively explain 
state level actions on the international stage. These early theories are by and large rooted in 
the principle that different states have different strategies and attitudes towards security 
and the use of military force that stem from many of the state's earliest experiences 
(Johnston, A.I., 1995, 34). These early iterations of the strategic culture paradigm make the 
idea that the actions a given actor has taken and will take can be explained through careful 
examination of the “formative” moments in its history the foundational element of its 
structure. These all important moment in a state’s past include such events as extreme 
militancy, Germany in the 1930’s and 40’s, or periods of vast imperial strength, Great 
Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
Much of the earliest work in the strategic culture field is rooted in the postulations 
of Jack Snyder. Jack Snyder’s work served as the theoretical forbearer to the more out and 
out "strategic culture" work of the later writers, specifically David Jones and Colin Gray. 
In fact, one of the earliest statements of the existence of such a concept came from Jack 
Snyder. In a 1977 report written for the RAND Corporation titled The Soviet Strategic 
Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations Snyder states that “It is useful to 
look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique strategic culture.” (Snyder 
J.,1977). While this statement is quite mild in comparison to some of the fuller bodied 
arguments of later theorists it may very well have been responsible for inserting the term 
"strategic culture" into the modern political science lexicon.  In Snyder’s work "strategic 
culture" is defined as the "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have 
acquired through instruction or imitation" (Snyder, J., 1977). This statement seems to have 
become the guiding light for many theorists, especially those of Alistair's so called first 
generation.  
The work of Colin Gray and David Jones directly followed and stemmed from 
Snyder's statements in his RAND paper.  To many the combined work of these theorists 
epitomizes early thought on the subject of strategic culture and served as a prominent 
theoretical vanguard. The writings of Gray and Jones focused extensively on nuclear 
strategy, the majority of it was written in the 1980's, and style of national military 
expression. In his work National Style and Strategy: The American Example Gray created 
his own definition for strategic culture means.  In this work he defined strategic culture as 
a unique set of cultural experiences that created certain ways of thinking and actions in 
regards to the role that the use of force should play in the international system (Gray, 
1981). It is Gray's assertion that these patterns in thinking established grew from 
"perceptions of national historical experience" (Gray, 1981, p.22) that in turn went on to 
create cultural norms that serve as motivations and foundational elements of military 
policy and doctrinal decisions. Much of Gray's work was focused on the United States and 
it was his conclusion that the American national historical experience produced a military 
establishment that relied on a unique set of "dominant national beliefs" with respect to 
strategic choices. After these postulations regarding the American national strategic 
doctrine he and other theorists slowly began to apply these ideas more broadly. 
These subsequent works included, on the other side of the coin, the writings of 
David Jones. Jones' work focused much more closely on cultural inputs that served to 
actually create the strategic culture whose existence was postulated in Gray and Snyder's 
work.  Jones' describes three discreet types of input that serve to shape strategic culture 
with each of these inputs ascribed to certain role to play in shaping and creating the 
national strategic cultures that become ingrained in the citizenry and policymaking elite 
alike.  The factors that Jones identified as contributing to the strategic cultures of nations 
are the large scale environmental factors, the second are the norms and beliefs of the 
nation's social culture, and the third are the small scale environmental relationships. 
The first of the inputs that Jones identifies are the "macro-environmental" factors such 
geography and "ethno-cultural characteristics." These are factors that cannot be changed or 
manipulated at will and have often been constant for much of a state's history. The second 
set of inputs perceived by Jones are what he terms "social inputs." that include economics 
and social structures. These are the aspects of a given nation t that can change over time, 
but are often slow to do so. The impact that this particular category of input has on the 
"strategic culture" of a given nation can be seen in some of the more mid-level decisions 
and constraints placed on decision makers. Jones believes that these middle of the road 
aspects can have an impact on policy and military decisions, but he does not seem to see 
them as being as important as the more formative moments of nation's history and the more 
ironclad restraints created by those moments. The third and final grouping of inputs are the 
more micro level inputs such as the relationship between civil and military society. These 
particular inputs are more minute in scale and seem to be, according to Jones, the least 
important inputs in terms of establishing actual constraints on military policy that can help 
to delineate what is a viable security policy. This type of input includes such things as the 
willingness of the public to go to war at a given time, the willingness to submit to military 
intrusions such as conscription that may affect daily life, and the overall level of trust that 
exists between the civilians and military classes (Jones, 1985). 
For these earliest of "strategic culture" scholars, the founding principal was not, as 
detractors often state, that individual states are irrational or entirely unique in their 
reasoning, but merely that the historic past has a strong role in the creation and 
organization of the ordered preferences that shape a state's military actions (Johnston, A. I. 
1995). However, even given this milder interpretation of their theories early "strategic 
culture" theorists seem to be overly deterministic for this particular case study. I tend to 
agree with Johnston that many of this early theoretical work had merit it was too limited in 
its applicability. The next group of theorists sought to resolve some of these issues. 
The Second Generation.  Following these early writings, and attempting to correct 
some of its flaws, Johnston postulated that a new groups of theorists began to emerge who 
sought to bring strategic culture studies back into the mainstream. This consequent 
generation bore a strong resemblance to their theoretical antecedents, but there are some 
differences. One of the seminal authors of the new group of strategic culture theorists is 
Bradley Klein. His paper Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance 
Defence Politics is an early example of the more moderate tact that was been adopted 
taken by the theorists who followed Gray, Jones, and Snyder (Klein, 1988). 
 In Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics 
Klein proposes yet another definition for strategic culture. The definition that he proposes 
is that strategic culture should be defined as a set of cultural attitudes that are "based upon 
the political ideologies of public discourse that help define occasions as worthy of military 
involvement" (Klein, 1988, p.136). In Klein's definition the theoretical foundation 
established by Jones' theory of three inputs is quite evident. In fact, it seems as though in 
many respects Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence is the 
expansion of Jones' third input, the relationship between military and civil society.  Klein's 
work portrays strategic culture as the method by which the foreign policy elite of the 
country seek to "legitimize" their "military activities" (Klein, 1988, p. 135). Essentially 
Klein saw strategic culture as means of giving the realist perspective of international 
relations more historical backing that would further legitimize its theories. The center piece 
of Klein's work is the American nuclear deterrence strategy that was used during the Cold 
War years. Klein saw American nuclear doctrine as the perfect blend of "defensiveness" 
and "retaliation" for the American public (Klein, 1988, p.136). This represents perfectly 
the thrust of this second wave of scholars. These writers saw historical context as far less 
important than the relationship between the current societal norms of a country and its 
military doctrine. That is not to say that Klein and his fellow authors wholly disregarded 
the impact that historic factors can have on the modern decision making process of military 
strategists. In fact, Klein said that in this updated version of strategic culture, particularly 
his, the decisions made by the military elite are not and cannot be based solely on a "real 
world that has an existence out there" and that they must also include considerations from 
past experiences as well (Klein, 1988, p. 100). 
In the first generation of literature much of the focus was on establishing a 
historical foundation to explain a modern state's actions and then use that information to 
"predict" how a state's military would respond to the day's security threats. Klein and his 
fellow scholars, like Stephen Rosen, are far more moderate in their assessments of the 
powers of the strategic culture paradigm. This group sees strategic culture not as the sole 
determinant of the actions a nation will take, but merely as a set of restrictions that must be 
considered before any decisions are made regarding the use of force or when assessing 
how another nation will react (Rosen, 1994). In Thinking About Strategic Culture Johnston 
effectively captures the spirit of this body of work by saying "widely available orientations 
to violence and to ways in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative 
enemies." (Johnston, 1995a, p.9).  
The Third Generation.   The third group of theorists that Johnston creates sought 
to strike somewhat of a middle ground between the first more predicative generation of 
theorists and the second more normative grouping of scholars. This body of work includes 
groundbreaking works such as Elizabeth Keir’s Culture and Military Doctrine: France 
between the Wars (Kier, 1995) and Jeffery Legro’s Culture and Preferences in the 
International Cooperation Two-Step (Legro, 1998). This particular cohort of theorists is 
among the more well regarded strategic culture thinkers as they often avoid many of the 
pitfalls of earlier works such as being overly deterministic. According to Johnston the 
definition of strategic culture used by this group fits one of two molds. The scholars 
contributing to this body of work define strategic culture as either a limiter that "presents 
decision makers with a limited range of options" or as a "lens that alters appearance and 
efficacy of different [military] choices" (Johnston, 1995a, p.42). 
As Johnston points out that the work of Keir, Klein and others in his "third 
generation" of theorists seems to be less deterministic and less definitive in their analyses 
than the first generation yet, on the whole, slightly more applicable than the second.  This 
group of scholars, perhaps even more than the second, emphasizes the effects that 
contemporary culture can have in determining a set of preferences for a given actor. 
Additionally, though this particular body of work seems to be more "eclectic", as Johnston 
put it, (Johnston A.I., 1995a, p.20) than its predecessors overall there does seem to be a 
slightly lesser value placed on historical context by this cohort. This is true in that much of 
this work surrounding this particular revision seems to be more focused on the current 
relationship between the military and the citizens of the given nation. This group, 
particularly Elizabeth Keir, sees "Strategic Culture" as an ever evolving doctrinal rule of 
thumb that is shaped by the events both contemporary and historic. This shift in focus can 
be seen quite clearly in Elizabeth Keir's work on the military philosophies of the French 
and English in the post World War Two Era. Keir argues that culture is the only way to 
explain the actions of these two former great powers during this period.  In her work Keir 
states that "strategic culture" is not just a product of the historical circumstances of a nation 
it is also shaped by the thoughts and feelings of a country's contemporary citizenry (Keir, 
1995).  The work of Jeffery Legro mimics many of the more fundamental elements of 
Keir's work albeit on a much smaller scale, the majority of his work analyzes smaller more 
specific case studies. Legro, like many of the other strategic culture theorists, states that 
"there is a need to move beyond static coordination, prisoner's dilemma, or zero-sum 
games to a richer variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical situations-and most 
importantly, a consideration of when and why such ''games'' change" (Legro, 1996, p.133).  
Whereas the early proponents were more definitive in their predictions the second, 
and the later third generations, as Johnston defines them, were less certain. These new 
groups of theorists saw shared strategic cultures as creating foundations upon which a 
given state’s foreign policy elite based their decision making process, but by no means was 
it regarded as the sole predictor. This particular avenue of study posits that states’ 
individual strategic cultures generate a range of possible options and actions from different 
“cultural” factors, that are both historical and more modern in nature (Johnston, A.I., 
1995b). It is from these two generations that Johnston draws the majority of the variables 
and factors examined in his own version of strategic culture. I have chosen to use the 
framework created by Johnston for this study because I believe that it serves as an 
excellent middle ground between the almost impossibly predicative elements of the early 
strategic culture work and the subdued iterations created by the later strategic culture 
theorists. Beyond this Johnston has already applied his paradigm to the Chinese in his book 
Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history from which this 
case study will borrow heavily. 
Methodology and Strategic Culture Analysis 
Alastair Iain Johnston created the framework for the paradigm I will apply in this 
study in his comprehensive analysis of strategic culture, Thinking About Strategic Culture, 
and then applied it in his book, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History. Johnston pulls from these three “generations” of work to generate his 
own definitions for what strategic culture is and which factors contribute to its creation. 
Like almost every other strategic culture theorist Johnston created his own definition for 
what strategic culture is and estimation of its affective powers. The definition employed in 
Johnston’s iteration, which serves as the foundational element of the entire paradigm, is 
that “strategic culture is an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting 
strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs."(Johnston A.I., 1995a, p. 46). Using this definition Johnston 
hoped to solve many of the issues he saw as detracting from and limiting the effectiveness 
of strategic culture studies. In addition to this slight definitional modification Johnston also 
creates a new standard for the affective powers of a strategic culture. In both of the above 
mentioned works on strategic culture Johnston states that strategic culture is not wholly 
deterministic, but it does allow the military apparatus of a given state to create a list of 
"uniquely ordered preferences" based on their internal makeup and history (Johnston, 
1995, 45).  Johnston uses this modified definitional framework to resolve what he sees as 
the numerous issues that face the hamper the efforts of the earlier strategic culture thinkers. 
The literature on strategic culture and strategic culture-like concepts seems to 
suggest contradictory conclusions: either a state's historically and culturally rooted notions 
about the ends and means of war limit the strategic choices of decision-making elites, as 
the first and third generations argue, or they do not, as the second generation holds. The 
research problem for each conclusion differs as well. The first conclusion implies that 
research ought to focus on how to isolate strategic cultural influences on behavior from the 
effects of other variables. The latter implies that we need to look at how strategic culture is 
used to obscure or mask strategic choices that are made in the interests of domestic and 
international hegemons. Johnston seeks to resolve all of these issues by restricting his 
analysis to three main variables. In Johnston's paradigm there are three main questions that 
must be answered in order to make detecting a strategic culture and defining that strategic 
culture possible. The three variables that Johnston deems essential to any examination of 
strategic culture are the nations view on the nature of war in the international system, the 
view that the actor takes on the nature of international relations itself, and the degree of 
esteem which the actor regards the use of force (Johnston, 1995a) 
The first variable that must be examined in Johnston's framework is the view on the 
nature of war in the international system. In Johnston's view this variable serves as one of 
the foundational elements of any strategic culture study. This variable can be viewed more 
broadly as whether the state regards war as an anomaly in the system or an inevitable side 
effect of interstate friction. Johnston views an understanding of this element as essential if 
one is to generate a complete understanding of the strategic mindset of any state and this is 
doubly true for the strategically advanced global states of the contemporary international 
milieu. How a given actor answers this one simple question can make a world of difference 
in terms of how the actor will view a given scenario. If a state regards war as an inevitable 
result of competitive interactions among the world’s powers than that particular state 
would likely be much more willing to go to war with another and less willing to take steps 
to mitigate the effects and causes of war. On the other hand, when an actor sees war as 
only a possibility then it is also likely that that actor will treat war as a symptom that can 
be cured. The states that view war as more of an aberration, many of the Western 
democratic powers for example, then become more likely to take steps to foster a more 
cooperative and multilateral system. This variable has enormous implications for a given 
state’s strategic culture and, by extension, its military actions on the international stage. 
The effect is so profound due to the fact that this variable is directly related to how an actor 
perceives the current international structure. If a state views war as an inevitability of a 
given multistate paradigm, be it regional or global, then it becomes far more likely that the 
state will seek to create change in that paradigm that often leads to conflict that can quickly 
devolve into war.  
The second variable that Johnston mandates be considered is whether or not the the 
internal cultural attitudes of an actor make it more inclined to view international relations 
as zero-sum game where all things are relative or as more nuanced system in which 
another's gain is not automatically their own loss. In essence this variable looks quite 
closely at the degree of cooperation which a state in essence the value that is placed on 
cooperation. If an individual state sees the international system as a strict zero sum game in 
which the gain of another is a loss to oneself, the classic realist power maximizing 
perspective, the effects on strategic culture can be enormous. This particular aspect of a 
strategic culture is so important because it has a close relationship with a country's 
willingness to cooperate with its global counterparts. The willingness to cooperate, or the 
opposite, can in turn have an extreme impact on strategic culture. 
On one hand, if an actor sees a possibility for and a value in mutual cooperation it 
will likely remove many of the policy options that are available to their zero sum 
counterparts, but it will also open up different options that the other group may not have. 
On the other hand, if an actor views international relations as zero sum game it eliminates 
many of the possible cooperative avenues of diplomacy. In both of these scenarios it on 
can easily see how broad an impact this fundamental strategic decision can have and how 
extensively this decision can shape strategic culture. Whether an actor views the 
international system as a strict zero sum game or cooperative system where benefits can be 
shared it does not matter for determining strategic culture. In either case, or anything in 
between for that matter, the number of available diplomatic options is greatly restricted by 
the norms set out by the culture. This restriction then leads to and aides the creation of one 
of the hallmarks of Johnston's strategic culture paradigm, a list of ordered strategic 
preferences.  
The third dimension of a given state's strategic culture is the value which the 
foreign policy elite and internal culture of the state assign to the use of violence or military 
action as a tool of international diplomacy. This particular dimension of study may prove 
to be the most easily viewed because it has the most direct impact on the international 
system. If a nation regards force as a cure-all that can be used to resolve a wide variety of 
issues, which is an obvious departure from current international sentiment, then it quite 
clearly points to a difference in culture that would seem to indicate that this particular 
nation does has a much different set of ordered preferences than most and will therefore act 
in a manner quite different from the others. It is easy to see how this would create a set of 
ordered preferences for a given country. If the state regards violence as an acceptable and 
perhaps even advantageous course of action than it is likely that using force will be placed 
at or near the top of its given set of preferred actions in a fair number of situations. On the 
other hand, if a state's foreign policy and internal domestic cultures regard the use of force 
and violence as an option of last resort, especially in regards to state to state interactions, it 
is likely that the use of force will be placed at or near the bottom of that states set of 
ordered preferences. 
It is easy to see why Johnston chose these particular variables as the dimensions by 
which he defines and examines strategic culture. In one sense the manifestation of these 
variables is easily observable in the international system. If a state has a tendency to use 
force than that particular proclivity will not take long to appear. The ease of observability 
that these dimensions provide makes them far more testable than many of the earlier 
iterations of strategic culture. However, this simplicity belies the versatility provided by 
this dimensional structure. Though there are only three real areas of examination within 
this paradigm they allow Johnston to plot and classify an almost endless array of actors. 
All of this makes it an excellent choice of model to examine the existence and nature of 
Australian strategic culture.  
Strategic Culture: The Case of Australia 
The method for determining whether or not a "strategic culture" exists utilized in 
this case study consisted of an examination various national security papers from various 
timeframes, the location of strategic goals, and then the determination of the level of 
congruence over time in regards to the stated goals of the Australian Defense Force (ADF). 
The search proved to be effective. When analyzing the Australian security documents of 
the past 50 years an observer can see an apparent pattern of language that emerges over 
time. In each of the documents analyzed there were a number of policy objectives and 
strategic goals that seemed to be have become ingrained in the Australian strategic and 
cultural mindset. These ingrained ideas are the precursors of a full blown strategic culture.  
There cannot be a strategic culture if there is no consistency in goals or attitudes to be 
examined. These goals were quite diverse and covered a variety of areas. They ranged 
from the quite obvious and universal goal of every state, maintain self-reliance and internal 
sovereignty, to the more abstract, contribute to and maintain the rules based global order of 
the present. Dating back to 1976 Australian strategic goals seem to have remained quite 
consistent and would appear to be rooted in the most formative years of the Australian 
nation-state. 
 The fundamental goal of every state and its leaders is to maintain the sovereignty of 
the state and the Australians are no different than the rest of the world in that respect. This 
prominent strategic goal mentioned at the very beginning of each white paper issued over 
the last fifty years is exactly what is to be expected of any state. Throughout the literature 
there are no shortages of statements by the Australian military and foreign policy decision 
makers regarding the importance of "self-reliance". Ensuring that Australia does not rely 
on any other country for the defense of its sovereign borders and to maintain the territorial 
and extra-territorial integrity enjoyed by Australia since the end of World War Two. This 
comes as no surprise given the fact that independence is a fundamental characteristic of 
any international actor. However, what is slightly different about these particular 
statements of individuality is the degree to which Australian "independence" is forced to 
coexist with their international obligations. These obligations and links appear repeatedly 
regarding their Western Allies, specifically the United States. 
Anyone who studies the current international system, let alone someone who 
reviews the strategic goals of Australia, knows that that the Australian's enjoy an unusually 
close relationship with the great powers of the west, specifically the United States. The 
ADF make references to and highlights the importance of maintaining close strategic ties 
to the United States. Statements such as "Over the last 70 years that peace and stability has 
been underpinned by a strong United States presence in our region" (Australia, Department 
of Defence, 2016) can be found in each of the "White Papers" examined despite the forty-
year difference between when the first and last were written. This symbiotic relationship 
has formal aspects such as the "Five Eyes" cooperative, the intelligence sharing collective 
consisting of the the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the ubiquitous 
Australian American Defense Pact mentioned in each of the papers examined. There are 
also more informal supports provided such as the sale of state of the art US military goods 
to the Australians (Australia, Department of Defence,2016). This enduring set of strategic 
partnerships have been in place since before World War Two and it is much more 
comprehensive than any other Australian strategic relationship. This long lived relationship 
with a nation on the other side of the globe in combination with the unusually close nature 
of the relationship would seem to suggest that there is some deeper level of connection 
than a pure realist mode of thought would accept.   
In addition to its relationship with the United States Australia also places a great 
deal of emphasis on and prioritizes maintaining amicable relationships with its Pacific 
neighbors beyond New Zealand. The island nations of Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste 
are mentioned specifically throughout the literature, specifically in 2013 Defence White 
Paper and 2016 Defence White Paper, as areas of heightened strategic importance to the 
Australian Defense Force. Australia's tendency to enter into cooperative relationships 
extends all the way to the countries of ASEAN and even to China, although this is 
admittedly a much more limited relationship. Even as far back as 1976, shortly following 
the US withdrawal from Vietnam, the Australians seem to indicate that they are willing to 
cooperate and work with their neighbors to ensure tranquility in the region and possibly 
forestall any armed conflagrations that may arise. This cooperative streak and its seeming 
inexhaustibility would appear to indicate that at the very least there is a slight inclination 
on the part of the Australian security apparatus to work with rather than against others. 
This tendency away from confrontational militaristic action even extends beyond the 
individual relationship the Australian's seek to utilize to an even broader scale, the global 
order itself.     
In addition to their emphasis on individual cooperation the Australian Defense 
Force has displayed a complete commitment to the "global rules based" order which it has 
a become a large part of. This vested interest in maintaining the global order that 
developed over the latter half of the 20th century with a country other than themselves, the 
United States, at its head would indicate a willingness to take a backseat in the strategic 
realm that may be indicative of larger cultural attitudes regarding the role Australia should 
play in the international system. This support of the United States' global primacy and the 
international system that stems from it order is a common theme in Australian strategic 
thought which includes the contribution of military forces to the "coalitions" established to 
protect this system. This commitment to upholding the order and rules based system is a 
common theme in ADF documents that reflects a lasting cultural belief that rules and 
institution based conflict resolution are important aspects of any functioning international 
paradigm. 
Taken together I believe that these statements and goals establish a clear pattern of 
action and preferences that the Australian Defense Force holds quite closely to. There are 
numerous strategic goals and statements that remain consistent over the fifty-year time 
period examined in this case study with the most prominent among them being an 
independent streak that is only subordinated by an overwhelming desire to to create and 
uphold an international regime that values cooperation, has rules that govern interaction, 
and institutions via which conflicts can be resolved prior to any possible armed 
engagements becoming necessary. 
When considering the previously mentioned goals and their continuity over time it 
becomes readily apparent that there is an undercurrent of cultural norms that support many 
of the goals the ADF has had over the second half of the 20th century. Now that the 
question of the existence of Australian strategic culture has been resolved it is time to turn 
to an examination of its form. This examination will be conducted through the lens of 
Johnston's three variable framework. As a refresher the dimensions along which the 
Australian strategic culture will be examine are the perceived inevitability of war, the 
efficacy of violence as means of resolving issues in the international system, and a given 
nation's view of the payout structure in international relations. Each of the dimensions will 
be examined and then synthesized into a comprehensive strategic culture that will in turn 
be evaluated on evidentiary grounds. 
Results: The Inevitability of War.  The first dimension of analysis is the view 
which the Australian's take towards the prospects of war. Within the strategic culture 
framework this aspect is defined as the extent to which a given nation believes that war can 
and should be avoided whenever it is possible to do so. This can have a profound impact 
on the strategic preferences and likely actions of a nation. For example, if the Australians 
believe that war was an endemic condition the current international system it is highly 
likely that there would be war in the region. This is due to the fact that if one country 
believes that war will inevitably happen that country will seek to strike first to ensure that 
the best possible war footing. Taking the view that war is an inevitability seems to be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. If the people and decisions makers of a nation go in search of an 
enemy, it is likely that one will be found. However, having said all of that it does not seem 
to be the case that the ADF views war in the region or around the globe as an inevitable 
side effect of international competition. 
At no point in the stated goals or methods sections of the ADF's strategic literature 
does it seem that the Australian "strategic culture" takes the view that war is inevitable. In 
fact, it seems as though the Australian "strategic culture" takes the exact opposite view of 
the world and state to state interaction. On the issue of the inevitability of war the 
Australian's seem to be firmly in the camp that it can be mitigated or even prevented given 
the proper conditions. In each of the documents reviewed for this work there are statements 
such as "The conjunction of such conditions [For War] is infrequent among the nations of 
the world" (Australia, Department of Defence,1976),"[The Australian ADF] places a high 
priority on working with others, at both the regional and global level, to further minimize, 
and if possible to eliminate, the risk of war, " (Australia, Department of Defence, 2000) 
"there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on 
Australian territory in the foreseeable future" (2016). These statements combined with the 
above mentioned emphasis on maintaining a "rules based" global order that values conflict 
resolution via international institutions and laws seem to indicate a society that believes 
war to be an aberration in the system of international affairs 
The most prominent reason for this attitude and indeed much of the Australian 
strategic culture's emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution is that the period reviewed in 
this study had a monumental starting point in the form of World War Two. Each of the 
documents reviewed for this study were created following World War Two and it is likely 
that the devastating impact that global war had affected the Australian strategic culture in a 
profound manner has created, in the Australian people and by extension their policy 
makers, a view that war should be avoided at all costs. The loss of life and the utter 
carnage brought about in those few short years of war is unmatched in human history and 
Australia's participation in it likely serves as the type of "formative" moment cited 
throughout the "strategic culture" literature. Additionally, the fact that such a momentous 
event occurred not long after the passage of the Statute of Westminster, the decree that 
dismantled the formal control exercised by the UK, serves to further indicate how 
impactful the war truly was on the collective Australian psyche (Australian history 
citation). In terms of preference creation and ordering this mindset drastically limits the 
number of options available to the ADF for the resolution of any international conflicts 
that may arise. A society that sees war as an abnormality is far less willing to tolerate its 
abominable effects.  
Results: The Efficacy of Force.  This leads to the second dimension of the 
strategic culture model, the efficacy of force. The second dimension is the degree to which 
a given nation views the use of force as an effective and acceptable course of action in the 
international paradigm (Johnston, 1995a). This dimension of study ties in quite closely 
with the first. It is often the case that a nation that views the international system as a zero-
sum game will more often view the use of force as an effective option and the opposite is 
also true. As can likely be inferred from the preceding paragraphs the Australian military 
establishment almost never views the use of force, especially in nation to nation conflict, 
as the most effective policy option. This is not to say that the Australian's entirely opposed 
to force as a tool of international relations. In Defence 200, the Australian white paper 
written in the year 2000, it is stated that "There remains a risk that circumstances may still 
arise in which these constraints [The rules based global system] are not effective." 
(Australia, Department of Defence, 2000) This seems to indicate that even though war is 
regarded as a last resort by the Australian ADF it can never be ruled out and they foresee a 
number of scenario's where it will be the most effective and in many cases only available 
response to a given threat. However, even with the acceptance of this never say never 
attitude it becomes readily apparent when reviewing the literature that the ADF and the 
remainder of the Australian military decision making apparatus believe the use of force to 
be an option of last resort. In all but a very select few instances, responding with military 
force seems to have been deemed excessive or ineffective by the Australian foreign policy 
establishment. 
The cultural attitudes present in Australian society and the resulting strategic 
culture of the ADF and the rest of the Australian policy making apparatus clearly create an 
ordered set of preferences that place as one of the least optimal decisions that can be made 
in almost any scenario. The set of preferences created by this cultural milieu often means 
that the ADF and the other members of the Australian security community are restricted in 
their decision making process. This apparent reluctance on the part of the Australian 
people to become involved in armed conflict has, in many ways, determined the actions of 
the Australian government on the international stage in regards to possible military 
ventures. In fact, over the last forty years the Australian military has only been involved in 
one armed conflict of any particular length, this was of course as a member of the United 
States led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Australia, Department of Defence 
2000). In addition to this it is also quite clear from the literature that the ADF is reluctant 
to engage in any future combat missions, unless explicitly called upon to do so by the 
United States or one of their close regional allies, such as Timor Leste or Papua New 
Guinea (Australia, Department of Defence, 2013) 
The attitude of a nation towards violence and its efficacy is an extremely important 
dimension in regards to determining how that nation will react in a prescribed set of 
circumstances and this particular dimension of the strategic culture paradigm seems to do 
an excellent job of encapsulating Australia's strategic view of force. Through this analysis 
it is quite clear that the Australian strategic worldview and cultural underpinnings have 
created a set of ordered preferences that do not view force as an effective tool in most 
situations. From this a number of determinations can be made as to how Australian 
tacticians will react in a given set of circumstances. When this analysis is applied to a 
hypothetical scenario in which the Australian's may become involved, such as a territorial 
dispute between China and one of the nations of ASEAN, (2013 Defence White Paper, 
2013) it is easy to see how a list detailing the range of possible actions could be generated 
based on the examined dimensions of Australia's strategic culture.   
Results: Are International Relations a Zero Sum Game?  The third and final 
dimension to be considered when evaluating the nature of Australian strategic culture is the 
philosophical approach that is taken towards international relations in terms of nature of 
the payout structure. In other words, does the Australian culture history and contemporary 
cultural dynamic make the ADF more or less inclined to view the international system as a 
zero sum game. This question is essential to gaining a full understanding of what the base 
values of the Australian strategic culture that guide the decision making process. After 
reviewing the strategic literature, the answer to this question seems to be quite definitely in 
the negative it is not the case that the Australian strategic apparatus regards international 
relations as a zero sum game where any improvement or benefit gained by another is in 
inherently a detriment to oneself.  
When reading the various outlines of Australian grand strategy, it becomes readily 
apparent that the Australian's view alliances and cooperation as inordinately important to 
their own success. An emphasis on alliance and coalition building does not of course 
preempt a nation from seeing the world as all or nothing it is possible after all that for 
whatever reason an alliance with one nation or another is viewed as the most beneficial 
action possible. However, the actions and stated strategic preferences of the Australian 
Defense Force seem to point quite strongly towards a belief in the possibility of symbiotic 
relationships that would be quite difficult to square with a zero sum attitude. 
The first and most overt evidence against a zero sum Australian view of the 
international system is the close relationship they seek to foster and maintain with the 
United States. At first blush this could easily be perceived as an entirely self serving course 
of action on the part of the ADF. After all the United States is and has been for the past 
sixty years the preeminent global military power and a strong relationship with such a state 
can only be regarded as beneficial. However, that quick assessment would belie a deeper 
understanding and level of cooperation that exists between the two countries. The second 
and perhaps even more persuasive piece of evidence suggesting that international relations 
are viewed in a more nuanced fashion by the Australians is their strong commitment to 
global stability, even at a cost to their own personal objectives at times.  It has been shown 
time and time again that the Australian's have a strong and ready commitment to 
maintaining the international global order and the rules based system that girds it. 
These two elements and modes of thought in addition to the other above mentioned 
intricacies of Australian strategic thought coalesce to give a clear picture of what 
Australian strategic culture. Australia's strategic culture is typified quite perfectly by the 
following quote from the Australian government's 1994 white paper ""Australia's strategic 
stance is, in the broadest possible sense, defensive. " The paper goes on to outline that 
while the Australian Defense force is "capable" it will not engage in armed conflict other 
than to defend Australian national interest's, and even in these small number of cases the 
use of force is a measure of last resort. 
Discussion.  "Strategic Culture" models of analysis, specifically Johnston's, seem 
to accomplish what they purport to do quite well. They seek to capture and visualize the 
thought process a given nation's military elite go through when making decisions in 
regards to war and grand military strategy. However, this is also the main issue that seems 
to exist within the strategic culture literature, it only applies to war. In the not too distant 
past this may have been an issue of negligible importance, but in the contemporary 
international environment this approach seems to be lacking.  
 The current international system has drastically reduced the likelihood of armed 
conflict, specifically interstate conflict. As a result, foreign policy elites and military 
planners around the world have brought an ever increasing number of areas under the 
purview of the military. This can be seen quite clearly with each successive "White Paper" 
written by the Australian government. Beginning with the statement that "Australia is 
among the first countries to be called on to assist in international security and humanitarian 
crises" in their 1994 outline the Australian Defense Force began to discuss alternate uses 
for their military forces. Following the 1994 White Paper the attention given to "non 
military threats" continued to rise. In each of the subsequent reports issues such as illegal 
immigration, organized crime, cyber security, global warming, terrorism, and drug 
trafficking were all mentioned as issues that were considered in the strategic ideation of 
what the ADF will be forced to contend with in the coming years and decades. 
All of this seems to indicate that over the latter half of the twentieth century, and 
especially following the conclusion of the Cold War, the "Strategic Culture" model became 
increasingly limited in its uses. "Strategic Culture" as defined by Johnston, Keir, Snyder, 
and their fellow scholars fail to properly capture the importance of a number of issues that 
were in the past considered outside of the military's purview or non-issues all together. In 
order for any type of "cultural" framework to be effective it must give decision makers a 
set of ordered preferences or at the very least a method whereby they can determine the 
palatability of certain actions within a given society (Johnston, A. I. 1995b).  These issues 
cannot be effectively ordered in the "strategic culture" model because this model is almost 
entirely concerned with evaluating the willingness of a society to accept the use of force in 
a given set of circumstances. Unfortunately, many of the issues that Australians see as 
threats to their overarching goal, maintaining the rules based status quo championed by the 
United States, are not mitigated or solved via the use of force. As such these security 
concerns cannot be effectively incorporated into the "Strategic Culture" framework and its 
emphasis on the use of force in military operations. 
Conclusion 
I would assess the strategic culture paradigm as useful yet incomplete. The 
paradigm espoused in the scholarly work by Johnston, Kier, Snyder, Klein, Gray, and the 
other "cultural" scholars of international relations seems to function well as an excellent 
heuristic for how a given nation and culture will react in certain circumstances, but only 
with regards to force and military issues. Restricting the study of a given nation's foreign 
policy apparatus to strictly military issues may be more acceptable for some of the smaller 
less globally oriented states in the international system, but even in those few cases it 
would seem that crucial issues are left if only the military dimension is examined. These 
issues that could be excluded would include such momentous dilemmas as climate change 
and international human trafficking. When the set of foreign policy circumstances has 
issues that have been historically disregarded by scholars of foreign policy such as public 
health and immigration the usefulness of strategic culture begins to diminish. To remedy 
this issue there are number of newer theories that have been proposed that seek to create 
more all encompassing definitions and paradigms.  
One such example is the concept of security culture (Kirchner and Sperling, 2010). 
Security culture can be best defined as the collective attitude and preferences of the foreign 
policy elite within a given state. This particular analytical framework places each state 
along a continuum ranging from entirely Westphalian to wholly Post-Westphalian based 
on certain defining characteristics. These characteristics are the way in which each state 
views external events, individual national identities, instrumental preferences of each state, 
and the interaction preferences held by each state.   Security culture uses many of the same 
attributes as strategic culture, but it tends to take a much broader range of issues and 
attitudes into account when determining the set of ordered preferences of a given nation. 
One of the principle distinction is that security culture considers a much broader set of 
possible actions when analyzing a given nation beyond military power. Security culture 
also examines the persuasive instruments that are at a state's disposal such as diplomatic 
negotiation or binding legal agreements among states (Sperling, 2010). 
Overall, this case study proved quite informative and allowed for a much deeper 
understanding of the Australian foreign policy culture, but also revealed the limitations of 
strategic culture as an organizing concept. I believe it to be far too limited in its scope and 
cannot account for the greatly expanded range of possible actions that a modern state has at 
its disposal. I suggest that in any future research strategic culture should be used as a 
starting point for and as a piece of a larger framework such as that of security culture. 
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